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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of the skill composition of migration
flows on the host country’s labour market in a specific-factors-two-sector
model with heterogeneous labour (low, medium, and high skill) and
price- and wage-setting behaviour. The low- and medium-skilled labour
markets are characterized by frictions due to wage bargaining. More-
over, we assume bumping down of unemployed medium-skilled workers
into low-skilled labour supply. Endogenous benefits create an interde-
pendency between the two bargaining processes. Particular attention is
paid to medium-skilled migration which enables us to augment the lit-
erature by replicating important stylized facts regarding medium skills,
such as i) the interaction between immigration, low-skilled unemploy-
ment and medium-skilled over-qualification, ii) the polarization effect
where both low- and high-skilled wages increase relative to the medium-
skilled. The model is calibrated using German data. The key findings
are: (i) a migration-induced supply shock of medium-skilled workers
decreases the low-skilled unemployment rate because of the endogenous
benefits; (ii) immigration of medium-skilled labour together with some
high-skilled labour has a positive effect on output per capita; (iii) mi-
gration of only medium-skilled labour has a neutral impact on GDP per
capita.
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1 Introduction
With the end of the transitional periods as of May 2011 the debate concerning
the East-West migration has revived in countries like Germany and Austria,
the closest countries to those new members, that had fully prolonged the transi-
tional periods up to seven years.1 The central concern regarding immigration
is the general perception that it will adversely affect the receiving country.
Typically, the debate clusters around the following topics: the labour market
effects, welfare effects, and racial or cultural effects (Dustmann & Preston,
2007).2 We focus here on the labour market effects. The empirical evidence
on the overall (average) natives wage and employment effects of immigration is
rather mixed and clusters around zero (Borjas, 2003; Dustmann et al., 2008),
while economic theory provides clear grounds for the “potential impact” of
migration. In general, the adjustment mechanisms of the receiving economy
to immigration are: changes in wages, in employment, in output, in goods
prices, and in production technology (Dustmann et al., 2008).
In spite of an overall negligible effect, it is well recognized that immigration
has a distributional effect for the native population which depends crucially
on factors such as changes in the skill structure, the substitutability between
natives and immigrants, and the elasticity of capital supply (see, for instance,
Borjas (2003); Ottaviano & Peri (2008, 2011) for a study on the U.S. labour
market, and Bru¨cker & Jahn (2011); D’Amuri, Ottaviano & Peri (2010); Fel-
bermayr, Geis & Kohler (2010), for a study on the German labour market).
The findings of these studies reveal that the easier substitutability becomes,
the larger the burden is for native workers, while perfectly elastic capital sup-
ply induces the so-called “immigration surplus” (Borjas, 1995).3 This type of
analysis denotes the shifts in the relative factor demand.
Additionally, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants face a higher
risk of being downgraded or over-qualified (see OECD (2007) for a cross-
1On 1 May 2004, eight CEECs, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia plus two Mediterranean countries Malta and Cyprus joined
the EU with Bulgaria and Romania followed on 1 January 2007.
2Several recent studies show that in general attitudes towards immigration are heteroge-
neous across native population and depend on the labour market situations, welfare consid-
eration and non-economic factors (see, for example, Dustmann & Preston, 2007; Dustmann,
Glitz & Frattini, 2008; Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Mayda, 2006). However, income effects are
more important in the welfare debate while educational background plays a dominant role
in the labour market debate. See also Boeri & Bru¨cker (2005) for a discussion on concerns
regarding “welfare shopping”.
3The main conclusion of these recent studies, using the canonical model (multi-nested
production technology), is that natives and immigrants are imperfect substitutes and that
newly arrived immigrants compete mostly with incumbent immigrants rather than with
native workers with similar characteristics.
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country evidence; Drinkwater, Eade & Garapich (2009); Dustmann, Frattini
& Preston (2012) for recent evidence in the U.K.). However, across the skill
groups the medium-skilled workers have a higher tendency to be over-qualified
relative to high-skilled workers (see Brynin & Longhi, 2009, for Germany).
This type of analysis emphasizes, in addition, the shifts in the labour supply
and justifies the anxieties of the least skilled natives regarding displacement
effects.4 In this paper, we revisit the labour market effects by using a differ-
ent approach to address both shifts in the relative labour demand indicating
the “substitution effect” as well as shifts in the labour supply indicating the
“crowding-out effect”.
In order to incorporate the different adjustment channels of immigration,
we develop a two-sector (“Manufacturing” and “Services”) model with workers
of different skills: “High”, those with a tertiary education, “Medium”, those
with a upper secondary education and apprenticeship training, and “Low”,
those with lower secondary or no formal qualification. High-skilled workers are
perfectly mobile between the two sectors while medium-skilled workers are only
employed in the manufacturing sector and low-skilled workers only employed
in the service sector. In particular, the labour markets of specific factors
are plagued by frictions due to wage bargaining. In line with the evidence
discussed above and for simplicity, we assume that unemployed medium-skilled
workers turn to the service sector by performing low-skilled jobs, whereas low-
skilled workers end up in unemployment. Furthermore, firms in both sectors
possess the monopoly power to set the goods prices for a final consumption-
good producer, thus allowing for endogenous goods prices. We then examine
the general equilibrium effects of an infra-marginal (i.e. a discontinuous jump)
increase in the labour force due to immigration.
Our analysis in this paper is novel relative to those papers examining si-
multaneously the impact of immigration on wages and employment for differ-
ent skill groups with labour market friction (such as Bru¨cker & Jahn, 2011;
D’Amuri et al., 2010; Felbermayr et al., 2010) because it also incorporates
sectoral composition and endogenous goods price effects. On the other hand
it is also novel relative to those papers that elaborate the goods price effects
and sectoral composition effects of immigration (such as Cortes, 2008; Fel-
bermayr & Kohler, 2006, 2007) because it includes labour market frictions.
4For example, Dustmann et al. (2012) empirically assess the immigration effect along
the wage distribution. Although the newly arrived immigrants to the U.K. have on average
higher educational attainment, the authors find that they are located at the lower end of
the wage distribution (indicating the downgrading/over-qualification effect). Their results
show a decline of the wages below the 20th percentile while wages above the 40th percentile
have increased.
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Particularly, our model enables us to address the concerns regarding the in-
teraction between immigration, low-skilled unemployment and medium-skilled
over-qualification.5
An important feature of the model is that it is capable to replicate the evi-
dence regarding low wage differential at the lower end of the wage distribution
in Germany due to unions wage compression (Dustmann & Scho¨nberg, 2009).
This is incorporated in our framework by the wage linkage between the low-
and medium-skilled labour markets resulting from the wage bargaining process
and endogenous unemployment benefits.
Another interesting observation that has recently attracted the attention
is the so-called “polarization” phenomenon in many developed countries (cf.
Autor & Dorn, 2010; Dustmann, Ludsteck & Scho¨nberg, 2009; Goos, Manning
& Salomons, 2009; Spitz-Oener, 2006). As we show in the next section, the
medium-skilled wages relative to low- and high-skilled have decreased in both
sectors between 1991-2005 in Germany. However, although Dustmann et al.
(2009) find evidence for polarization in occupation in Germany in the same
period, their results regarding wage convergence between low-and medium-
skilled workers is not significant. Actually, the authors observe an increase in
the wage inequality at the bottom of the wage distribution and the rationale
for this is a supply shock of low-skilled workers in the 1990s induced by the
break down of the Soviet Union. Similarly, we argue that the recent migration
pattern from Eastern to Western European countries (i.e. in the 2000s) might
explain the wage polarization induced by a relative supply shock of medium-
skilled workers.6 This is the next novelty of our paper as it enables us to
replicate important stylized facts regarding medium skills discussed in the
next section.7
In general, our model, calibrated to the German economy, generates the
following interesting predictions:
• Due to the wage linkage, a migration-induced supply shock of medium-
skilled workers generates a decline in the low-skilled unemployment rate.
• The stronger the wage linkage, the lower the wage differential between
the low and medium skill groups owing to immigration.
• A supply shock of medium-skilled workers generates wage polarization
5Beladi (1990) shows that of specific factor accumulation can increase the total employ-
ment in an unemployment-plagued economy. However, he neither incorporates goods price
effects nor heterogeneous labour force.
6See Kahanec & Zimmermann (2010) for a survey on recent migration pattern in the
course of the EU enlargement and Blanchflower, Saleheen & Shadforth (2007) for recent
pattern in the UK.
7Storesletten (2000) is an exception doing generational accounting for medium-skilled
migration.
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and has approximately a neutral GDP per capita effect.
The set up of the paper is as follows. The next section presents the stylized
facts on migration pattern, labour market composition, and trends in employ-
ment and wages in the manufacturing and service sectors for Germany. In
section 3 we demonstrate the theoretical framework with two major sectors,
three skill groups and a double wage bargaining model determining the wages
of medium- and low-skilled labour. In section 4, we provide first a qualita-
tive assessment of the comparative static analysis, derived by means of log-
linearisation around the steady-state, followed by an intuitive interpretation of
the theoretical results. In section 5, we calibrate the model for Germany using
the EUKLEMS data set to measure the quantitative importance of various
migration scenarios. Finally, section 6 presents the concluding remarks.
2 Stylized facts
At the aggregated level, the average impact of immigration on unemployment
and wages of native workers has been explored quite extensively and tend to
cluster around zero, as discussed above. However, as already emphasized, the
literature on migration has somehow ignored the potential impact of medium-
skilled work force, although it accounts for a large part of the total labour force
as well as of the foreign work force nowadays. Table 1 highlights this feature
in the case of Germany by showing the composition of the total labour force
across manufacturing and service sectors as well as of the foreign labour force
by skill groups for the years 1991 and 2005. Noticeable, the most pronounced
increase was in the share of foreign medium-skilled labour.
Table 1: Total and foreign labour force, by education groups
1991 2005
Total Mig. Total Mig.
Skills Agg. Manuf. Serv. Agg. Manuf. Serv.
High (%) 8 6 9 4 10 7 10 6
Medium (%) 64 63 65 48 62 66 61 61
Low (%) 28 31 25 48 28 27 28 33
Notes: Agg.=Aggregate, Manuf.=Manufacturing, Serv.=Services,
Mig.=Migrants. The total shares denote the shares in hours worked,
and are calculated from EU KLEMS. The number for foreigners are taken
from Bru¨cker & Jahn (2011), but denoting, respectively, the years 1990 and
2004. Medium-skilled consists of the educational groups: vocational and
high-school.
Another phenomenon that has recently attracted the attention is the job
4
Table 2: Changes in wage rates and employment shares, by education and
industry
1991− 2005
Wage Rate Employment Share
Manufacturing Sector (in %)
High 59 25
Medium 40 4
Low 42 −15
Service Sector (in %)
High 44 13
Medium 36 −7
Low 41 5
Notes: The numbers denote log-differences. Employment shares
designate the shares in hours worked. Source: EU KLEMS.
polarization phenomenon in many developed countries. Table 2 presents this
for Germany where we show the percentage changes in the total employment
shares as well as in the wage rates by education and industry for the period
1991-2005. One sees clearly that high-skilled employment shares increased in
both sectors, whereas the low-skilled share in manufacturing declined and the
medium-skilled share in services. Moreover, both low- and high-skilled wages
grew faster relative to medium-skilled wages reflecting the U-shaped trend
found in the empirical literature (see, for example, Autor & Dorn (2010) for
the U.S. and Goos et al. (2009) for Europe). While the main rationale behind
this trend is explained by the advances in information and communication
technology (see, for instance, Van Reenen, Michaels & Natraj (2010)), this
paper gives an alternative explanation. We show that it might also be due
to relative increase in the medium-skilled labour force due to migration. This
brings us to the next stylized fact.
A study by OECD (2007) documents that the labour market performance
of immigrants is denoted by higher risk of over-qualification. Recent studies on
post-EU-enlargement provide further evidence. For example, Drinkwater et al.
(2009) analyse the performance of Polish immigrants in the UK labour market
and find that majority of them are employed in low-skilled and low-paid jobs
despite having relatively high levels of education.8
Moreover, a recent study by Brynin & Longhi (2009) finds for Germany,
using households survey data, a relative excess of over-qualification at the
medium-skilled level which contributes to almost half of all overqualified per-
sons. This indicates that beside the standard argumentation of denoting the
technical change as the main deriving force behind the increase in low-skilled
8See also Kahanec & Zimmermann (2010) for a review of the recent literature.
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unemployment rate, the increase in the low-skilled unemployment rate might
be the consequence of an increase in supply of better educated workers leading
to the so called “crowding-out” of low-skilled workers. Using German data,
Figure 1: Trends in low-skilled unemployment and over-qualification rates
Note: The over-qualification (OQ) rate denotes the proportion of medium-skilled workers in
low-skilled jobs. Source: Eurostat.
Figure 1 shows the relation between low-skilled unemployment rate and the
proportion of medium-skilled workers in low-skilled type of jobs. Except for
2000-2004 (the ICT bust period) where a positive relation can be seen, it desig-
nates a reverse relation, especially, in the recent years. This observation might
be the result of changes in the labour market institutions in 2005 (also known
as Hartz reforms).
We summarize these stylized facts as follows
1. Medium-skilled workers constitute a major component of the labour
force and of immigrants
2. High-skilled employment rises in both sectors with low-skilled declining
in manufacturing sector and medium-skilled in service sector
3. Medium-skilled labour has a higher incidence of over-qualification
4. There is a negative relation between the over-qualification rate in low-
skilled jobs and the low-skilled unemployment rate
5. Both low-skilled and high-skilled wages have increased relative to the
medium-skilled wage, which points at wage polarization
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3 The theoretical framework
The economy is defined by two major sectors, manufacturing (Ym) and services
(Ys), each producing a good by utilizing physical capital and labour. These two
goods are in turn used in a CES aggregate to produce a final consumption good
(X). We interpret X as the total GDP which is taken as the numeraire, i.e. its
price is set to unity. The CES aggregate can be interpreted as the production
technology of a final good sector or as the utility function of a representative
household. In light of the stylized facts reported in Section 2, we assume
that medium-skilled labour is specific to manufacturing sector and low-skilled
labour specific to the services sector - although bumping down of medium
skilled labour to low skilled service jobs can occur. Capital and high-skilled
labour are employed in both sectors. We assume that firms in manufacturing
and services sectors have a monopoly power which is ensured by a fixed entry
cost. The high skilled wage is determined on a competitive labour market,
but medium and low skilled wages are determined by wage bargaining. We
elaborate these points below in the context of a general equilibrium framework.
3.1 Final consumption good
The final consumption good (or the GDP) is produced by the following CES
function
X =
(
γY
θ−1
θ
m + (1− γ)Y
θ−1
θ
s
) θ
θ−1
(1)
where θ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two sectors and
0 < γ < 1 is the distribution parameter. From (1), we obtain the isoelastic
demand functions for manufacturing and service goods
Y dm = γ
θX
(
Pm
P
)−θ
(2a)
Y ds = (1− γ)θX
(
Ps
P
)−θ
(2b)
respectively, where P =
(
(1− γ)θP 1−θs + γθP 1−θm
) 1
1−θ denotes the macroeco-
nomic price index which is taken as numeraire in the remaining part of the
analysis. As a consequence all variables are defined in real terms and we as-
sume no inflation.
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3.2 Manufacturing and services goods
After incurring a fixed cost, firms in both sectors produce a good with a stan-
dard Cobb-Douglas production technology with constant returns to scale. Note
that positive profits are ensured simply by the assumption of relatively high
fixed costs such that free-entry is ruled out, see Cahuc & Zylberberg (2004, Ch.
7) for a general discussion. Based on our discussion above, in the manufactur-
ing sector high- (Hm) and medium-skilled (M) labour are employed, whereas
in the service sector high- (Hs) and low-skilled (L) labour are utilized. The
production functions for manufacturing and services are given by
Ym = AK
ν
mH
α
mM
1−α−ν (3a)
Ys = BK
η
sH
β
s L
1−β−η (3b)
respectively, where 0 < {α, β, ν, η} < 1. The total factor productivity in
manufacturing and services is denoted by exogenous variables A and B, re-
spectively, with A > B reflecting the higher productivity of manufacturing
relative to services.
3.3 Factor demand
Firms determine factor demand by minimizing their costs given the factor
prices. The rental cost of capital, r∗, is determined on the international capi-
tal market since capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile.9 Furthermore, high
skilled workers are assumed to be mobile between the service and manufac-
turing sectors. As a consequence the high-skilled wage is equalized between
the two sectors: wmH = w
s
H = wH . The wage bargaining in the medium skilled
and the low skilled labour markets determine wM and wL, respectively. Fac-
tor demand, then, is determined by minimizing the manufacturing production
costs
Cm = wHHm + wMM + r
∗Km (4)
subject to production technology (3a). Similarly, factor demand in the service
sector is determined by minimizing the service production costs
Cs = wHHs + wLL+ r
∗Ks (5)
9For simplicity, we assume that intra-trade is balanced in each sector. For a terms-of-
trade effect see Felbermayr & Kohler (2007).
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subject to the production technology (3b). Solving the optimization problems,
the factor demand functions in the manufacturing sector are given by
Hdm = α
Ym
A
( wH
Wm
)−1
(6a)
Md = (1− α− ν)Ym
A
( wM
Wm
)−1
(6b)
Kdm = ν
Ym
A
(
r∗
Wm
)−1
(6c)
and in the services sector by
Hds = β
Ys
B
(wH
W s
)−1
(7a)
Ld = (1− β − η)Ys
B
(wL
W s
)−1
(7b)
Kds = η
Ys
B
(
r∗
W s
)−1
(7c)
whereWm =
(
r∗
ν
)ν (wH
α
)α ( wM
1−α−ν
)1−α−ν
andW s =
(
r∗
η
)η (
wH
β
)β (
wL
1−β−η
)1−β−η
denote the geometric weighted average factor price composite in the manufac-
turing and services sectors, respectively.
Substituting (6a)-(6c) into the cost function, (4), and similarly (7a)-(7c)
into (5), we obtain the minimized cost functions
C∗m(wH , wM , r
∗) =
Wm
A
Ym (8a)
C∗s (wH , wL, r
∗) =
W s
B
Ys (8b)
for manufacturing and service good producers, respectively.
3.4 Price setting for intermediate goods
As shown in the previous section, firms in the two major sectors face a downward-
sloping domestic demand function for their products. Therefore, a represen-
tative manufacturing good producer sets the price of her good by maximizing
her profit
Πm = PmYm − C∗m(Wm, Ym) (9)
subject to (2a). Similarly, a representative service good producer maximizes
her profit
Πs = PsYs − C∗s (W s, Ys) (10)
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subject to (2b). Solving the maximization problems, yield the standard pricing
behaviour, respectively, in the manufacturing and service sectors
Pm =
θ
θ − 1
Wm
A
(11a)
Ps =
θ
θ − 1
W s
B
. (11b)
3.5 Wage setting and the labour market features
As discussed above, high skilled workers are mobile between the two interme-
diate sectors, and we assume labour market clearing for them. However, in
line with the European labour market institutions, wage bargaining occurs in
both low- and medium-skilled labour markets - see, for example,Bru¨cker &
Jahn (2011) where wage-setting curves differ across sectors. In our framework
two different labour unions negotiate the wages for medium- and low-skilled
workers in the manufacturing and services sectors, respectively. But, as we
elaborate below, wages are not independent. On the one hand medium skilled
workers can be bumped down into the service jobs, earning low-skilled wages,
which influences the reference wage of medium skilled workers. On the other
hand, medium skilled wages will have an impact on the level of the benefits,
which will influence the reference wage of low skilled workers.
Following Booth (1995) and Layard, Nickell & Jackman (2005), wages are
determined by the right-to-manage bargaining solution so that the negotiating
parties only bargain over the wages, whereas the optimal employment deci-
sions is made by the firms. In doing so, we also follow the conventional way by
assuming that in each sector there exists a continuum of identical firms and
unions and therefore neglect firm-union-specific indices (cf. Koskela & Sten-
backa, 2009, 2010). Firm’s net gain is simply the flow of profits, i.e. net of the
fixed costs. This is given for the manufacturing and services firms, respectively,
by the equations (9) and (10). The net gain for the labour union is simply the
net result of the bargained wage and the outside option. Thus, the objective
function of the manufacturing and service labour unions is given, respectively,
by
Um = (wM − w¯M)M (12)
Us = (wL − w¯L)L (13)
where w¯j, ∀j = L,M denotes the outside option which is taken as given by
each labour union. Thus, the medium-skilled wage is the result of the following
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maximization problem
max
wM
ΩM =
(
(wM − w¯M)Md
)δm
Π1−δmm s.t.(2a), (6b), (9), (11a)
Similarly, the low-skilled wage is set by solving the following maximization
problem
max
wL
ΩL =
(
(wL − w¯L)Ld
)δs
Π1−δss s.t.(2b), (7b), (10), (11b)
where δi (i = s,m) denotes the bargaining strength of the labour union. The
solution of the wage negotiation yields, after some manipulation, the standard
result
wj = (1 + λi)w¯j ∀ j = M,L (14)
where the mark-up on the medium- and low-skilled outside options is given,
respectively, by
λm =
δm
(1− α− ν)(θ − 1) (15a)
λs =
δs
(1− β − η)(θ − 1) . (15b)
3.5.1 Manufacturing wage curve
As shown by the stylized facts, medium skilled workers have a relatively high
incidence of over qualification. Several empirical studies suggest that a signifi-
cant and increasing proportion of low-skilled jobs are nowadays carried out by
better educated, over-qualified workers - see Borghans & de Grip (2000) and
Hartog (2000) for an overview of these studies.
Following these stylized facts, we assume that the medium-skilled workers
face the risk of holding a low-skilled job in the services sector when they cannot
find employment in the manufacturing sector. As a consequence, they will lead
the low-skilled workers into unemployment. This suggests that the rise in low-
skilled unemployment would not only be the result of a relative demand shift,
but also the consequence of a relative supply shift which leads to “crowding-
out” of low-skilled workers as has also been observed by Pierrard & Snessens
(2003).
The medium-skilled over-qualification rate is defined by
oM = 1− M
NM
(16)
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with NM as the total medium-skilled labour force.
Since frictions in the medium-skilled labour market is described by the
over-qualification risk, then in the general equilibrium context as well as by
the symmetry assumption, the reference wage of a medium-skilled worker (w¯M)
can be interpreted as:
w¯M = (1− oM)wM + oMwL. (17)
Substituting this expression into (14) and rearranging, we obtain the manu-
facturing wage curve (WCm)
wM = Φ(λm, oM)wL, (18)
where Φ(λm, oM) =
(1+λm)oM
1−(1+λm)(1−oM ) . That is, as long as the manufacturing
union has some bargaining power, δm > 0, it will set a markup denoted by
Φ(·) over the low-skilled wage rate. If, however, δm → 0, then λm → 0 and
wM → wL denoting the perfect competition case. One can easily show that
∂Φ/∂oM < 0 implying the wage curve is increasing in employment of medium
skilled workers.
3.5.2 Service wage curve
The low-skilled unemployment rate is defined by:10
uL = 1− L− oMNM
NL
(19)
with NL denoting the total low-skilled labour force.
Contrary to manufacturing, low-skilled workers face the risk of being unem-
ployed and thus receiving an unemployment benefit, b. Recalling the symme-
try assumption, the outside option (or the average income) of the low-skilled
workers is defined as:
w¯L = (1− uL)wL + uLb (20)
Furthermore, we assume that the level of benefits is tied closely to the average
wage which is in line with the evidence. Weiss & Garloff (2009), for example,
show that the level of benefits is tied closely to per-capita income in most Eu-
ropean countries while in the Anglo-Saxon countries there was no adjustment
10Note, the service trade union does not take into account the crowding-out effect when
negotiating over the wage rate and therefore, the perceived unemployment rate is simply
given by upL = 1− LNL . We use this property in the analysis of the interaction between the
service and manufacturing wages.
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over the last two decades. Consequently, we define b as a percentage (ξ) of
average low- and medium-skilled wages weighted by κ:11
b = ξ(κwM + (1− κ)wL). (21)
Using this definition for b in (20) and substituting then the resulting equation
in (14), after rearranging, we obtain the following aggregated service wage
curve (WCs)
wL = Ψ(λs, uL)wM (22)
where Ψ(λs, uL) =
(1+λs)ξκuL
(1+λs)(1−ξ(1−κ))uL−λs . Similarly to the manufacturing wage
curve, one can verify that ∂Ψ/∂uL < 0. Hence the wage curve is increasing in
the employment of low-skilled workers. Note that if the service labour union
looses the bargaining power, then the perfect competition outcome with no
unemployment results, i.e. if δs → 0, then λs → 0 and wL → b. Moreover,
from 20 and 21 it follows that the higher the weighting parameter κ is, i.e. the
stronger the linkage to the medium skill wage, ∂Ψ
∂κ
> 0. Thus, we conclude
Proposition 1. A stronger linkage between low- and medium-skilled workers
owing to bargaining process and endogenous unemployment benefit, induces
wage compression at the lower end of the wage distribution.
This is in line with the cross-firm evidence for Germany where the wage
differential between low and medium skilled workers in unionized firms is lower
relative to non-unionized firms (Dustmann & Scho¨nberg, 2009).12
3.6 Interaction between low- and medium-skill wages
Due to the risk of over-qualification and the endogenous unemployment ben-
efits, there is an interdependency between the low- and medium-skill wages.
We show that the condition for the unique equilibrium is assured by the fact
11Note that for κ = 0 we obtain the standard definition of unemployment benefits as the
constant “replacement rate”, b/wL = ξ. In this case, however, the linkage between wL and
wM disappears and the service wage curve will be defined as wL = (1+λs)((1−uL)wL+uLb).
Consequently, the equilibrium unemployment rate, uL, will be constant and depends only
on the parameters of the model implying that it does not react any longer to a migration
shock. However, conducting the quantitative analysis for exogenous unemployment benefits
(b¯), we find that the unemployment rate responds much stronger. In particular, a supply of
medium-skilled workers induces a displacement effect of low-skilled workers. Results will be
provided upon request.
12Computing the effects for different values for κ, we find that a stronger linkage between
low- and medium-skilled workers (i.e. κ→ 1), reduces the magnitude of changes in relative
low-medium skill wages.
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that both wage curves are monotonically increasing in the wage rates, start-
ing from positive intercepts. However, the latter requires lower boundaries
on both unemployment and over-qualification rates. Moreover, both curves
should intersect such that the following relation is ensured, wM > wL > 0 .
We now elaborate on the shape and properties of both wage curves derived
in the previous section.
3.6.1 Properties of manufacturing wage curve
The partial features of the manufacturing wage curve (i.e. taking wL as given),
can be demonstrated as follows. For a better realization, rewrite (18) as
wL
wM
= Φ(λm, oM)
−1 ≡ 1− λ¯m
oM(wM)
(23)
where λ¯m =
λm
1+λm
and oM(wM) is given by (16). Now, the LHS and RHS can
both be seen as a function of wM for given values of wL. This is because man-
ufacturing unions take the outside option (wL) as given when they negotiate.
Then, it can be easily verified that the LHS of (23) is a decreasing function of
wM but the RHS is increasing for certain values of both oM and wM , as will
be discussed below. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Properties of manufacturing wage curve
wM1
1 1
1+λm
relative wage curve: wL/wM
oM
Φ−1(wM )
Φ−1(oM )
o˜M w˜M
Consider first the right panel of Figure 2. Then, recalling (18), we can draw
two curves: one shows the negative relation between the relative wage rate due
to changes in wM (LHS of (23)) holding the low-skilled wage fixed; the second
curve illustrates the positive relation between the inverse-wage-mark-up func-
tion (Φ−1) and the medium-skilled wage rate (wM). This relation follows from
the positive relationship between the over-qualification rate and the medium-
skilled wage rate as higher wages induces a decline in the labour demand
and increase, thus, the risk of over-qualification. Recalling the medium-skilled
labour demand (6b) and the over-qualification rate (16), then, one can verify
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the limit cases
lim
wM→∞
Md = 0 ⇒ lim
wM→∞
oM = 1 ⇒ lim
wM→∞
Φ−1 =
1
1 + λm
.
The intersection between the two curves in the right plane will determine the
equilibrium over-qualification rate and medium-skilled wage level for changes
in the low-skilled wage rate.
We conclude
Lemma 1. Positive wages are ensured iff oM ∈ (o˜M , 1).
Proof. The proof is rather straight forward. Due to the non-negativity as-
sumption of the wage rates, it follows from (23):
Φ−1 > 0
λ¯m
oM
< 1
oM > o˜M ≡ λm
1 + λm
wM > w˜M ≡
[
(1− α− ν)(r/ν)ν(wH/α)α
NM
(1 + λm)Ym
A
] 1
α+ν
where we used the over-qualification definition (16) and labour demand func-
tion (6b) for the last inequality. This defines the lower boundary of the over-
qualification rate.
3.6.2 Properties of service wage curve
Similarly, the partial behaviour of the service wage-curve can be assessed as
follows. First, rewrite (22) as
wM
wL
= Ψ(λs, uL)
−1 ≡ 1 + 1− ξ
ξκ
− λ¯s
ξκuL
(24)
where λ¯s =
λs
1+λs
. With the same intention described above, we define both
the LHS and RHS of (24) as functions of wL for given values of wM . The
argumentation is analogue to one on the manufacturing wage curve. Thus, we
can define two curves with opposite relations to changes in wM as shown in
the right plane of Figure (3), whereas the left plane shows the relation between
(Ψ−1) and the unemployment rate (uL).
However, the condition that must be satisfied in this case is summarized
by the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The relation wM > wL is ensured iff uL ∈ (u˜L, 1).
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Figure 3: Properties of service wage curve
wL1
1 + 1−ξξκ 1 +
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
relative wage curve: wM/wL
uL
Ψ−1(wL)Ψ
−1(uL) 1
u˜L w˜L
Proof. From (24), it follows:
Ψ−1 > 1
λ¯s
uL
< 1− ξ
uL > u˜L ≡ λ¯s
1− ξ
wL > w˜L ≡
[
(1− β − η)(r/η)η(wH/β)β
((1− q)NL)
Ys
B
] 1
β+η
where q ≡ (1− λ¯s
1−ξ ). For the last inequality we used the definition of perceived
unemployment rate (explained in footnote 10), and the low-skilled labour de-
mand (7b). This implies that for values of unemployment rate uL ∈ (0, u˜L] the
relation between low- and medium-skilled wage rates is violated, i.e. wM ≤ wL.
Therefore, to ensure wM > wL, the unemployment rate must be strictly larger
than the lower boundary u˜L.
Now, from these conditions, the unique intersection of the two wage-setting
curves can be shown graphically in the (wM , wL)-plane. By Lemma 1 and 2,
wM > wL > 0. This indicates that in the (wM , wL)-space the wage relation
should always be above the 45 degree line. Starting with WCm, one sees from
the RHS plane of Figure 2 that for large values of the low-skilled wage rate,
the medium-skilled equilibrium wage rises along the Φ−1 curve due to upward
shifts of the relative wage curve. Hence, higher wL increases equilibrium wM
and with it the over-qualification rate which converges to 1+λm, the reciprocal
of the limit shown in Figure 2.
Analogously, the derivation of WCs can be explained by recalling the RHS
of Figure 3. Now, changes in wM are associated with moving along the Ψ
−1
curve. However, as explained above, the necessary condition requires that
Ψ−1 > 1 for wL > w˜L. This indicates that in (wM , wL)-space the WCs must
16
Figure 4: Unique equilibrium
WCs
WCm
1 + λm1 +
1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
wL
wM
w∗M
w∗L
45
w˜L
w˜M
start above the 45 degree line. As described above, higher wM leads to higher
wL along the Ψ
−1 curve converging to the limit 1 + 1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
. However, it should
be noted that in the (wM , wL)-plane, the inverse service wage curve is drawn.
To ensure a unique equilibrium, 1 + 1−ξ−λ¯s
ξκ
> 1 +λm must hold which leads to
the following lemma.
Lemma 3. A unique intersection between the two wage curves is ensured for
all
ξ < ξ˜ ≡ 1
1 + λs
1
1 + κλm
.
In Table 3, we summarize these conditions and assume that they hold.13
An illustration of the interdependence process is that an increase in produc-
tivity of manufacturing, relative to that of services, increases the wage rate in
the services sector without any justification by the corresponding productivity
increases in the latter. This phenomenon is also widely recognized as the main
cause of the so-called Baumol’s disease, which refers to the increasing share of
services relative to manufacturing in an advanced economy - see, for instance,
Hartwig (2011). It also corresponds to the observation that the low wage dif-
ferentiation in the Continental Europe is attributed to the centralization and
13In the calibration of the model we show that these conditions do hold for plausible
parameter values - see Appendix A.
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Table 3: Equilibrium Conditions
Parameter/Variable Range Condition
oM ∈ (o˜M , 1) Lemma 1
wM > w˜M
uL ∈ (u˜L, 1) Lemma 2
wL > w˜L
ξ < ξ˜ Lemma 3
coordination of wage formation (Siebert, 1997).
4 The General Equilibrium Solution
In this section we present the general equilibrium comparative static analysis.
The approach we choose is the following: First, we derive the changes from the
initial equilibrium induced by an infra-marginal change of the labour force due
to migration. We then give the intuitive interpretation of the results followed
by a summary of the general equilibrium repercussions on the over-qualification
and unemployment rates as well as on the relative wages.
4.1 A theoretical assessment without capital input
Following the standard approach pursued by Jones (1965), the comparative
static analysis can be assessed by means of log-linearization to denote changes
from the initial equilibrium, i.e. xˆ = ln
(
x+dx
x
) ' dx/x.
By the Le Chatelier–Samuelson principle, ignoring capital will only af-
fect the results quantitatively, but not in qualitative terms, see Felbermayr &
Kohler (2007). For that reason, and for convenience, we simplify the analysis
by setting ν = η = 0, and thus reducing the model to a two-factor production
function with labour as the only input factor.
To begin with, take the total differentiation of the log-difference of the
labour demand functions (6a) and (6b), (7a) and (7b), to obtain
wˆH − wˆM = Mˆ − Hˆm (25.1)
wˆH − wˆL = Lˆ− Hˆs (25.2)
Linearising the equilibrium conditions for the low- and medium-skilled labour
markets, L = (1−uL)NL+oMNM and M = (1−oM)NM , as well as the market
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clearing condition for the high-skilled labour, yield
Lˆ = l(NˆL − u¯LuˆL) + (1− l)(NˆM + oˆM) (25.3)
Mˆ = (NˆM − o¯M oˆM) (25.4)
NˆH = hHˆm + (1− h)Hˆs (25.5)
where u¯L =
uL
1−uL , o¯M =
oM
1−oM , and h =
Hm
NH
. Note that changes in the low-
skilled employment are weighted by l = (1−uL)NL
L
. Similarly, log-linearisation
of the wage curves (18) and (22), yield
wˆM − wˆL = εmoˆM (25.6)
wˆL − wˆM = εsuˆL (25.7)
where εm = − λ¯moM Φ(·) and εs = − λ¯sξκuLΨ(·) denote the wage curve elasticities.
From the price-setting definitions (11a) and (11b) we obtain
Pˆm = (αwˆH + (1− α)wˆM) (25.8)
Pˆs = (βwˆH + (1− β)wˆL) (25.9)
Log-linearisation of the intermediate goods demand equations, (2a) and (2b),
yields
Yˆm = Xˆ − θPˆm (25.10)
Yˆs = Xˆ − θPˆs (25.11)
Changes in the total output can, then, be determined by log-linearising (1)
which yields
Xˆ = ϕxYˆm + (1− ϕx)Yˆs (25.12)
with ϕx = γ
(
Ym
X
)σx
= PmYm
X
denoting the share of Ym in X. Finally, log-
linearising the production functions (3a) and (3b), respectively, yields
Yˆm = αHˆm + (1− α)Mˆ (25.13)
Yˆs = βHˆs + (1− β)Lˆ (25.14)
This system of fourteen equations, (25.1)-(25.14), allows for the assessment of
the general equilibrium effects on the fourteen endogenous variables Xˆ, Yˆm, Yˆs,
Pˆm, Pˆs, Hˆm, Hˆs, Mˆ , Lˆ, oˆM , uˆL, wˆH , wˆM , wˆL.
19
4.2 Comparative static analysis
In this section we examine the impact of an exogenous increase in the labour
supply, which we attribute to immigration in each of the labour markets of
our model. Particularly, we are interested in the repercussions on the low- and
medium-skilled labour markets and on output. Intuitively, the wage-setting
mechanism reveals that any exogenous increase in the labour endowments
worsening (or improving) the labour market condition for one of the unionised
labour, ceteris paribus, has also consequences for the other unionised labour.
This is due to the fact that an increase in oM (or uL) will force the unions for
wag restraint. Therefore, the wage linkage between both medium- and low-
skilled unionised workers, resulting from the double bargaining mechanism as
well as the endogenous unemployment benefits, implies that the outside op-
tion of the other unionised labour market will be affected too. Note that the
bumping down effect has an additional direct impact on the low-skilled wages
as uL increases, see Eq. (19).
Accounting for the general equilibrium repercussions, however, we find that
the wage restraint behaviour induces a higher labour demand for that type of
labour. This is accompanied by changes in the allocation of high-skilled labour
across the sectors as well as in the demand for goods due to goods price effects.
As we show below, the crucial factor that determines the qualitative impact of
migration reveals to be the factor cost share of the high-skilled labour. In what
follows, we omit the formal proofs and provide instead the economic intuition
of the results.14.
The first interesting outcome of the analysis regarding changes in the wages
as well as in unemployment and over-qualification rates is the following
Proposition 2. A proportional 10% increase in supply of all three skill groups
is consistent with almost no change in the wages as well as in over-qualification
and unemployment rates.
This is a standard result as the proportional increase of the labour force
implies a scale effect and thus more resources are available in the economy to
utilize (Dustmann et al., 2008). Note, however, that the marginal productivity
of labour, the high-skilled labour reallocation, the output expansion of both
sectors all depend on the size of (α − β), as we show below when discussing
migration of each type of labour separately. Intuitively, for similar cost shares
of the high-skilled labour across the two sectors, i.e. (α−β)→ 0, both sectors
14A full formal derivation of the general equilibrium comparative static analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper, and is therefore given in an extra appendix which can be provided
upon request.
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expand symmetrically due to proportional changes in the production costs, or
alternatively in the marginal productivity, and thus inducing constant relative
goods prices. Therefore, X, Ym, Ys, L and M all increase approximately
proportionally. As shown in the last column of Table 4, the impact of migration
of any skill group on X is always positive. Thus, setting Xˆ = 0 does not affect
the results qualitatively, and allows for a better exposition of the driving forces
behind the immigration effects.
Next, we discuss the qualitative effects of an exogenous shock of each of
the skill groups separately on low- and medium-skilled labour markets. An
alternative way to demonstrate the effects on the unemployment and over-
qualification rates is to reduce the system of equations derived in the previous
section and to solve it for oˆM and uˆL. In doing so, we obtain the following
expressions15
oˆM =
(θ − 1)θ
ζ
(β − α)wˆH − (β + θ(1− β))− (α + θ(1− α))(1− l)
ζ
NˆM
+
(α + θ(1− α))l
ζ
NˆL (26)
uˆL = −κoˆM (27)
where ζ is a negative constant and κ = εm
εs
> 0. These two equations can
be utilized to illustrate the role of the high-skilled cost shares (α, β), and to
analyse the effects of different migration flows.
Table 4: Comparative Static Results
wˆH wˆM wˆL oˆM uˆL Xˆ
NˆH
β > α + −
β = α − + + 0 0 +
β < α − +
NˆM
β > α +/− −/+
β = α + − − + − +
β < α + −
NˆL + − − − + +
Assume first the scenario where only high-skilled immigration is allowed,
i.e. NˆH > 0 = NˆM = NˆL. Unambiguously, the Walrasian nature of the high-
skilled labour market induces a decline in wˆH . The labour market implication
15The derivation can be worked out as follows: equalize (25.13) and (25.10) as well as
(25.14) and (25.11) to eliminate Yˆm and Yˆs. Then, solve (25.1) and (25.2) for Hˆm and Hˆs,
respectively, and substitute them in the previously obtained equations. We then obtain two
equations which can be solved for wˆM and wˆL. Utilizing them in Eq. (25.6) and making
use of (25.3) and (25.4), then after rearranging we obtain Eq. (26).
21
for the other two skill groups reduces, therefore, to the coefficient of wH in
(26). However, the crucial assumption that characterizes this coefficient is the
following. As pointed out by Hamermesh (1993), in a two factor model the in-
verse of the elasticity of substitution is called the elasticity of complementarity
indicating the percentage change in factor prices due to a 1 percent change in
relative inputs. It denotes how factor prices that a representative firm must
pay respond to an exogenous change in factor supply. Using a Cobb-Douglas
function implies that both elasticities of substitution and of complementarity
equal unity. On the other hand, the goods demand functions show to what
extent demand for the two goods will adjust for changes in the goods prices
which is determined by the parameter θ. Thus, in our setting, the labour sub-
stitution effect within each of the two major sectors is always dominated by
the goods demand effect, i.e. θ > 1. This relation is shown in the numerator
of the wˆH coefficient in Eq. (26).
16 The results are summarized in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3. If the economy is characterized by a Cobb-Douglas technology
and 1− 1/θ > 0, then high-skilled migration has
i) a neutral impact on both low- and medium-skilled labour markets for all
α ≈ β
ii) a positive (negative) effect on the low (medium)-skilled labour market for
all α < β, and vice versa.
The intuition is the following. It is clear that the right-hand-side of (26)
reduces to the coefficient of wH . As mentioned above, due to the complemen-
tarity effect both wˆL and wˆM increase. However, the relative increase depends
on the size of the high-skilled cost share in each sector. The complementar-
ity effect, for example, will be stronger in the manufacturing sector, for all
α > β, as the marginal productivity of medium-skilled workers rises relatively
stronger than of low-skilled workers - or alternatively, we could argue that
manufacturing firms experience a stronger decline in the production costs rel-
ative to the firms in the service sector. As goods prices are endogenous, the
relative manufacturing goods price declines inducing a favourable shift in the
demand for manufacturing goods, and thus, to a reallocation of high-skilled
labour towards that sector. However, in the service sector the demand for
low-skilled labour increases accompanied by a decline in uL and an increase
in oM . This can be verified from the coefficient of wH in (26). The opposite
result for α < β follows by analogy. These effects are illustrated in the first
five columns of Table 4 related to the impact of high-skilled migration (NˆH).
16See Felbermayr & Kohler (2007) for the case of CES production functions.
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The assessment of only medium-skilled migration, i.e. NˆM > 0 = NˆH =
NˆL, leads to the following results
Proposition 4. Immigration of only medium-skilled workers has a negative
effect on both medium- and low-skilled wages, a positive effect on the over-
qualification rate, but a negative impact on the low-skilled unemployment.
In this case, the right-hand-side of (26) reduces to the two first expressions
on the RHS. It is straightforward that the high-skilled wage rate increases due
to the complementarity effect. Therefore, following the discussion above, we
have to elaborate on the signs of the two coefficients. Assuming (α − β) →
0 the analysis reduces to the coefficient of NˆM which will be then simply
−(α+θ(1−α))l/ζ with ζ < 0. Thus, the medium-skilled labour market friction
unambiguously increases which in turn indicates from (27) that uˆL < 0.
17 The
intuition behind the increase in the over-qualification is that due to labour
market frictions not all new arriving medium-skilled workers can be absorbed
by the labour market. This can be verified from (25.4) where the medium-
skilled labour demand grows less proportional to NˆM . Since, the bumping
down effect induces in turn an increase in low-skilled unemployment, ceteris
paribus, the unions in the service sector are forced for wage restraint inducing a
decline in the low-skilled wage. However, lower wages induce an increase in the
demand for low-skilled employment. On the other hand, the relative increase
in the high-skilled wage rate due to the complementarity effect, induces firms
to substitute for high-skilled labour in both sectors. The low-skilled labour
demand effect is stronger so that the bumping down effect is dominated which
is also verified by our numerical assessment. Thus, the decline in the low-skilled
wage rate is mitigated by this effect.
This leads us to the second interesting observation where the relative wage
effects are consistent with wage polarization. This can be simply verified from
(25.6) where for (α − β) → 0, oˆM > 0 inducing wˆM − wˆL < 0. Similarly, it
holds by utilizing (27). Obviously, it follows wˆH − wˆM > 0 from (25.1).
Proposition 5. Medium-skilled immigration induces wage polarization.
The discussion on the results of low-skilled immigration is based on sim-
ilar argumentation. A summary of the results is presented in Table 4. As
mentioned above, the Table also shows that total output will increase in all
scenarios. The reason is obvious. A more interesting question is, however,
whether output per capita will increase. To answer that question we will turn
to the simulation results of the model, presented in next section.
17In the unlikely extreme where (α − β) → −∞, we find oˆM < 0 < uˆL inducing (wˆM −
wˆL) > 0.
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5 Numerical assessment
To simulate the model, we use the EUKLEMS database to calibrate the param-
eter values which is presented in Appendix A. We use the calibrated parameters
and benchmark values of the variables to simulate the impact of migration on
output and the labour market.
5.1 Migration scenarios
Similarly to Felbermayr & Kohler (2007), we simulate migration scenarios for
different skill compositions of migration flows. Table 5 gives an overview of
our simulation scenarios.
Table 5: Simulation scenarios
Scenario Description
(I) Perfectly balanced immigration
(II) Inflow at tails
(III) Inflow of medium- and high-skilled
(IV) High-skilled inflow only
(V) Medium-skilled inflow only
(VI) Low-skilled inflow only
In scenario (I), we assume a proportional increase in all skill levels which re-
sembles approximately the Dutch immigration scenario, see Muysken & Ziese-
mer (2011). In scenario (II) we assume immigration to be composed of 75%
low-skilled and 25% high-skilled labour. As pointed out by Felbermayr &
Kohler (2007), this denotes the most realistic case for the past in the OECD
countries, as it features bimodality in migration flows with a bias towards
low-skilled migration. We also simulate the model for the current migration
pattern within the EU (scenario (III)) where the majority of migrants from
new member states (Poland and Baltic states) are predominantly young with
medium- or high skill levels (Blanchflower et al., 2007). In doing so, we use as
a benchmark the relative share of high-skilled foreign labour force in the U.S.
which can be seen as a target value and subtract from that the value for Ger-
many.18 We, then, compute the percentage inflows such that the overall size
of inflows equals 10% of the total labour force.19 The resulting inflow consists
18As used in the migration literature, see Ziesemer (2011), we take the Worldbank data on
migration stocks which provide information by educational attainment of immigrants and
total labour force. However, the Worldbank data set provides only information for 1975 to
2000 which we use as a proxy.
19The computation is as follows: the share of high-skilled immigrants in the U.S. labour
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for 44.3% of high skilled workers and the remaining part, 55.7%, is medium
skilled. We also assess the quantitative impact of each skill groups separately
in the scenarios (IV)-(VI). Furthermore, to ensure comparability between the
different cases and due to the fact that just under 10% of the German work-
force are foreign born, all scenarios are specified such that the overall size of
the inflow is approximately 10% of the initial labour force. Finally, we assume
a full adjustment of capital stock. Hence, the results indicate long-run effects.
5.2 Simulation results
The effect of various migration inflows is shown in Table 6. Interestingly, a per-
fectly balanced migration flow has a neutral impact on the receiving economy.
This is mainly due to the linear homogeneity nature of the production functions
and full capital adjustments which verifies the results of the theoretical part
(Section 4.2). Migration flow at the tails of the skill distribution (scenario II)
has mild positive wage effects for low- and medium-skilled labour, while high-
skilled labour is hurt slightly. The labour market conditions of medium-skilled
workers improve significantly while low-skilled unemployment risk is increased
slightly. Deterioration in the relative commodity prices induces favourable
demand shift for service goods and thus triggers relatively more high-skilled
towards that sector. We see that the one-skill-type migration policy (scenarios
(IV)-(VI)) reflect perfectly the predictions of the model discussed in the theo-
retical part. Therefore, changes in commodity prices (Pm, Ps) due to changes
in factor prices (wH , wM , wL) have significant effects on the reallocation of the
mobile labour and on the labour market outcomes of the sector-specific labour.
Looking at the welfare effects by means of GDP per head, we obtain the widely
observed results where high-skilled migration (scenario IV) is unambiguously
beneficial for the receiving country reflected in an increase of GDP per capita
by 9% whereas low-skilled migration (scenario VI) might indeed be harmful,
a decline of GDP per capita by 2%. However, with respect to medium-skilled
migration (scenario V), the result implies a neutral impact as denoted by the
overall increase of GDP per capita by almost 10%. Moreover, the impact on
the relative medium-skilled wage rate shows the polarization effect confirming
our hypothesis that the rise in medium-skilled migration might partly explain
this phenomenon.
Finally, the most plausible scenario of a migration flow at the higher skill
force is about 10.91% and in the German labour force about 6.48% in 2000 which makes a
difference of 4.43%. Therefore, in scenario (III) the high-skilled labour force has to rise by
44.30% = 4.43% × (N/NH) which gives us a total increase in medium-skilled labour force
by 8.80% = (10%− 4.43%)× (N/NM ).
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Table 6: Simulation of labour market effects of migration
% changes in Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Labour supply NˆH 10.00 11.13 44.3 100.00 0.00 0.00
NˆM 10.00 0.00 8.80 0.00 15.88 0.00
NˆL 10.00 33.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 37.04
Relative wages wˆH − wˆM 0.00 −2.84 −37.24 −98.86 11.81 9.05
wˆL − wˆM 0.00 −0.743 0.48 0.72 0.28 −0.91
Over-qual. rate oˆM 0.00 −5.38 3.43 5.24 2.00 −6.61
Unempl. rate uˆL 0.00 0.60 −0.39 −0.59 −0.22 0.74
Employment
Medium Mˆ 10.00 7.12 4.25 −6.95 13.23 8.76
Low Lˆ 10.00 9.44 7.57 3.27 11.04 10.07
Reallocation Hˆm 10.00 9.97 41.50 91.91 1.41 −0.29
Hˆs 10.00 11.54 45.29 102.86 −0.50 0.10
Capital Kˆm 10.00 8.06 11.08 11.47 10.83 7.52
accumulation Kˆs 10.00 9.63 14.88 22.42 8.93 7.91
Prices Pˆm 0.00 0.37 0.89 2.57 −0.44 0.09
Pˆs 0.00 −0.15 −0.37 −1.08 0.19 −0.04
Output Yˆm 10.00 7.69 10.19 8.90 11.28 7.43
Yˆs 10.00 9.78 15.25 23.50 8.74 7.95
Xˆ 10.00 9.17 13.75 19.19 9.49 7.80
Notes: Scenario (I) has, actually, an asymmetric impact. That is, expansion of
service sector is slightly stronger than of manufacturing, e.g. Yˆs = 10.000103
and Yˆm = 10.000088. This is due to the fact that the high-skilled shares are
not identical. Subtracting 10% from the output values reveals the per capita
values.
distribution (scenario III), which is dominated by medium skilled workers, has
a positive welfare effect as per capita income rises by 3.75%. This induces us
to conclude that overall medium skilled immigration might generate a positive
economic outcome.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we present a theoretical model motivated by our stylized facts
with two major (manufacturing and services) sectors and heterogeneous labour
markets (high, medium, and low skills) to analyse the impact of various skill
composition of immigration. While the impact of migration flows with different
skills on the sectoral decomposition, goods prices and labour market outcomes
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for the receiving country has been analysed separately, to our knowledge, no
paper exists that examines the impact of immigration in a general equilib-
rium framework combining low-skill unemployment and medium-skill over-
qualification in conjunction with endogenous goods prices. At the same time,
the existing literature has paid less attention to the repercussions of medium-
skill immigration considering simultaneously its impact on over-qualification
and unemployment. Our stylized facts highlight the importance of this specific
skill group and the analytical solution of the model verifies that it is able to
reproduce these stylized facts. We elaborate the labour market as well as the
GDP impacts of different migration scenarios. The following outcomes are at
the core of our analysis.
First, the wage linkage at the lower level of the skill distribution (low and
medium) owing to wage bargaining and endogenous unemployment benefits
prevent the crowding-out effect of low-skilled workers induced by a supply
shock of medium-skilled workers. In particular, medium skill immigration
boosts the labour market of the low-skilled labour. At the same time, the wage
linkage causes the wage compression between low and medium skills which is
consistent with the cross-firm evidence for Germany. Second, our framework
indicates that the recent wage “polarization” effect might be partly explained
by the relative increase in the supply of medium-skilled labour.
Third, even under the assumption of perfectly elastic capital, a perfectly
balanced immigration flow (i.e. matching the skill distribution of natives) can
generate changes in wages and employment, due to the sectoral decomposition
induced by endogenous goods prices. We show that this outcome depends
crucially on the sectoral intensity of the mobile factor (here the high-skilled
labour).
Using data for Germany, we quantify the impact of different immigration
scenarios. In line with the common conclusion regarding the effect of skilled
and unskilled, we also find that high-skilled immigration is beneficial for the
receiving economy (increasing the GDP per capita by more than 9%), whereas
low-skilled immigration is harmful (a decline in GDP per capita by more than
3%). Focusing on the medium-skilled immigration, we find new insights that
augment the current findings in the literature. The results reveal, indeed, that
immigration of medium-skilled labour can generate favourable economic out-
comes. Beside improving the labour market conditions for low-skilled labour
it also increases total output to the increase of the labour force, indicating a
neutral impact. Moreover, simulating the recent migration pattern (medium-
and high-skilled) in the course of EU enlargement reveals an improvement by
3.75% in per capita income.
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Furthermore, the endogenous goods prices resulting from the price-setting
behaviour are the important economic mechanism in explaining the substi-
tutability between different type of labour. Our findings reveal that labour
migration has a productivity effect for the firms by lowering the production
costs. This in turn explains the changes in the skill intensity across the sectors
which in the case of the Cobb-Douglas technology is essentially determined
by the relative high-skilled cost shares across the sectors. Moreover, the neu-
tral impact of medium-skilled migration gives an important insight for policy
design regarding migration policies to satisfy the future labour replacement
demand, for instance, due to ageing.
A Benchmark statistics and calibration
In order to provide a numerical solution of the model, we match the theoretical
model with the data for a certain period. In doing so, we define values for the
production side such as the input shares as well as for variables and parameters
of our designed labour market like unemployment and over-qualification rates.
Our exogenous parameters are (α, β, ν, η, σx, θ, κ, ξ, δm, δs, λm, λs). The en-
dogenous variables are (Hm, Hs,M,L, uL, oM , wH , wM , wL, l, h, Ym, Ys, Pm, Ps)
with the following exogenous variables (NH , NM , NL). We compute the values
mostly from the EUKLEMS database.20 We also use when necessary different
sources to obtain the values for the specific labour market parameters and
variables. Table 7 provides an overview of the calibrated and benchmark equi-
librium values. Note, in order to have the best-fit of the model with the data,
we define the cost shares of the specific input factors simply as the sum of
low- and med-skilled workers cost shares in each sector. Table 8 summarizes
further the labour market benchmark values.
20For an extensive description of the data and the calibration approach, we refer the reader
to the working paper version which will be provided upon request.
28
Table 7: Calibrated and benchmark equilibrium values for the industries
Description Parameter/Variable Value
Manuf. value-add (in 1000 Euros)(a) PmYm 583,191
Service value-add (in 1000 Euros)(a) PsYs 1,393,790
High-skilled labour force (in 1000 persons)(a) NH 3870
Med-skilled labour force (in 1000 persons)(a) NM 24043
Low-skilled labour force (in 1000 persons)(a) NL 10092
Total labour force N = NH +NM +NL 38005
Unemployment rate(b) uL 0.156
Manuf. capital cost share(a) ν 0.27
Manuf. high-skilled cost share(a) α 0.11
Manuf. med-skilled cost share(a) 1− α− ν 0.62
Serv. capital cost share(a) η 0.38
Serv. high-skilled cost share(a) β 0.13
Serv. low-skilled cost share(a) 1− β − η 0.49
Elasticity of Substitution(c) θ = 11−σx 4
σx 0.75
(a) Computed from EUKLEMS data base.
(b) From OECD (2007, Table II.A1.1), denoting 2003-
2004 average.
(c) From Abraham, Konings & Vanromelingen (2009).
29
Table 8: Labour market benchmark values
Description Parameter/Variable Value
Over-qualification rate(d) oM 0.57
Manuf. high-skilled empl. (in 1000)(e) Hm 1012
Serv. high-skilled empl. (in 1000) Hs = NH −Hm 2859
h = HmNH 0.26
Med-skilled empl. (in 1000) M = (1− oM )NM 10339
Low-skilled empl. (in 1000) L = (1− uL)NL + oMNM 22223
l = (1− uL)NL/L 0.38
High-skilled wage rate(f) wH = αPmYm/Hm 63.38
Med-skilled wage rate(f) wM = (1− α− ν)PmYm/M 34.97
Low-skilled wage rate(f) wL = (1− β − η)PsYs/L 30.73
Manuf. trade union bargaining power(g) δm 0.137
λm 0.0743
Serv. trade union bargaining power(h) δs 0.087
λs 0.0658
Proportionate factor(i) ξ 0.565
Weighting factor(j) κ 0.50
Manuf. wage curve Φ(·) = wMwL 1.14
Service wage curve Ψ(·) = wLwM 0.88
Elasticity manuf. wage curve εoM = −∂ log Φ(·)∂ log oM = − λm1+λm 1oM Φ(·) -0.14
Elasticity serv. wage curve εuL = −∂ log Ψ(·)∂ log uL = − λs1+λs 1ξκuLΨ(·) -1.23
(d) Calibrated to ensure wH > wM > wL > b.
(e) Calibration is based on the condition αPmYmHm = wH = β
PsYs
NH−Hm .
(f) Calibration is based on the EUKLEMS data.
(g) Calibrated from the manufacturing wage-setting curve (18) and (15a).
(h) Calibrated from the manufacturing wage-setting curve (22) and (15b).
(i) Assumed.
(j) Assumed.
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